I have currently have two main research projects. The first investigates whether there is generally a fact of the matter about conditional claims like "if the coin was flipped, it would have landed heads" and "if I wasn't a philosopher, I would have been a social scienctist" and whether work on indeterminacy can solve certain puzzles to do with conditionals and probability. The second focuses on the hindsight evaluation of deontic modality. I argue that deontic modals are information-sensitive and argue that in evaluating whether a act was wrong from a position of hindsight, we routinely alterate between meaning that the act was retrospectively wrong (wrong given what we now know) and prospectively wrong (wrong given what was known at the time). I also have interests in empirical work on norms of assertions/belief/decision.
Beevers, Tom. "Vagueness, Conditionals and Context-Sensitivity". Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (forthcoming).
Beevers, Tom. "Non-propositionalism and the Suppositional Rule." Erkenntnis (2022): 1-22.
Beevers, Tom. ‘Vagueness-Induced Counterexamples to Modus Tollens’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 120: 3 (2021), pp. 405–416
Beevers, Tom; Pike, Lottie, “The Folklore Trilogy and The Female Point of View” in Philosophy and Taylor Swift (forthcoming), Blackwell's Philosophy and Popular Culture Series.
I distinguish between two different kinds of supposition. Supposing that the facts are a certain way whilst holding the meanings fixed; and supposing the meanings are a certain way, holding the facts fixed. I distinguish between two different kinds of conditionals that we assert in natural language. One assessed by the former kind of supposition, the other using the latter. I provide a semantics for both kinds of conditionals within a multidimensional supervaluationist framework. I argue that this framework makes sense of our patterns of credences in conditional statements.